It is extremely difficult to combine cultures to achieve any major goal. NASA has three core cultures, human space flight (HSF), engineering and science, which must be integrated to achieve the great objective of returning humans to the Moon and to Mars. In the Moon to Mars (M2M) architecture document, NASA clearly states the purpose of these extraordinary efforts: To conduct world-class science, setting a national stance that will influence the future of humanity and inspire current and future generations.
Over my 50-year career, I have seen the world of space from many different vantage points: national lab, startup venture, consultant, NASA Ames center director, peer-reviewed journal editor, and assistant professor at Stanford. These experiences have exposed me to the strengths and weaknesses of all three cultures and given me some insight into how to mix them to explore other worlds.
Science
As the founder of NASA’s Astrobiology Institute, I learned firsthand that it can be challenging to get disparate scientists, including geologists, astronomers, and biologists, to work together. For example, the first requirement was to develop a common language to bridge the gap between minerals, parsecs, and DNA. Along with better understanding of other subjects came the absolute necessity of being in the same room at the same time. Exchange of documents and papers is fine, but only after various science groups reach consensus under the leadership of a highly respected scientist who values interdisciplinary work. Science is a grassroots effort where everyone must be heard, consensus reached after lengthy debate, and then continually re-examined as new data emerge. The same is true for developing M2M science objectives.
engineering
Two NASA missions to Mars disappeared in 1999. As a result of these failures, I was asked to go to NASA Headquarters and fix the mess. Upon my arrival, I discovered that at least five different individuals had claimed leadership of the existing Mars program. My first duty was to make it clear that I would be in charge as the first Mars Program Director. Today’s program suffers from a similar problem: Those of us observing Artemis and M2M cannot identify the overall leader. A solution must be found for this. Next, there is a need to bridge the distrust between organizations and cultures. Inspiring scientists to work with engineers (and vice versa) to develop a flight project is a unique challenge that requires special management skills. The fundamental need for each group is to understand and respect the capabilities and contributions of the other. Scientists discover things using the time-tested method of hypothesis generation, experimentation, and data analysis; Engineers make things using established processes of physics, design, analysis, and testing. Inspiring scientists to create implementable requirements that will lead to new discoveries and engineers to develop a robust design that is cost-effective is best achieved through an iterative approach that leverages the best program leadership available. Uses. I’m pleased to say that the restructuring my team and I did resulted in a 20-year roadmap for successful Mars missions.
human space flight
In 2003, I was asked to serve as the sole NASA member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. For seven months, the Board worked deeply inside the shuttle program to determine not only the technical causes of the loss of the crew and vehicle, but also what organizational and cultural issues led to the tragedy. . I learned that the HSF mentality is top-down and hierarchical with a strong personal dedication to the mission. This culture also brings with it a certain degree of stubbornness. It was only after my live TV demonstration about the technical cause of the crash that all the “what ifs” disappeared and the approach to return to flight could be unanimously adopted.
Finally, while the scientific community may resemble a debating society, the HSF appears more like an army with its own chain of command. That said, the key difference from scientific operations is that in HSF, lives are at stake. Compared to robotic science missions, manned missions to the Moon or Mars must include human health and performance requirements, which presents an undeniable fundamental difference between the two mindsets. Engineering culture supports both enterprises, although in somewhat different ways.
culture change
While working at the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, I also learned that once established, under constant pressure and leadership from the top, culture changes only slowly. Because science is formally stated as one of the three pillars for NASA’s exploration architecture, achieving an integrated, so-called One NASA approach to M2M requires a blend of science, engineering, and unique HSF characteristics. Will happen. And that will take some time – possibly years. Simply changing the name plate on a door or box on an organizational chart is not enough.
What can be done to facilitate and accelerate the bridging of the cultural divide? I think one must have real dedication to the NASA M2M program, starting with asking top leadership (Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Associate Administrator) to embrace the principles of cross-organizational culture change and then ensuring the next layer of NASA leadership Is. Is skilled and committed to interdisciplinary and inter-organizational efforts. In that spirit, I recommend that NASA Headquarters immediately appoint a program scientist with equal authority and stature to the existing program management staff for Artemis and M2M.
Subsequently, there is a need for a series of relevant project scientists at the lower level who will work hand in hand with the current Artemis and M2M project staff and engineers. Those scientists must be skilled in planetary science, astrobiology, and human health and performance disciplines, and be able to communicate with external communities.
Finally, I suggest an independent permanent review board composed of people from outside NASA that include senior scientists (with recognized achievements in science described above), engineers, technologists, managers, and leaders who are responsible for the progress of Artemis and M2M. Can meet regularly to review. This group cannot be reactive, but must be proactive in pursuit of the NASA goal of humanity exploring other worlds to meet the three pillars of science, national stance, and inspiration.
Getting humans back to the Moon and to Mars is a generational goal that may require new organizational structures, technologies, and scientific creativity, but it is a challenge worthy of a great nation, and America is up to the task!
Yes. Scott Hubbard has held prominent roles at NASA, including director of Ames Research Center, first Mars Program Director, founder of NASA’s Astrobiology Institute, and sole member of the agency’s Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Hubbard, now retired, serves on the National Academy, NASA, and other committees and holds eight NASA Medals, including the Distinguished Service Medal.
